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Introduction
After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, more than 200 political parties emerged. Eventually, 48 of them were allowed to participate in the June 1999 elections, the first free elections since 1955. Voter turnout was very high, as was the enthusiasm of the population. Surprisingly, the new party system that has emerged as a result of the election is reminiscent of that of the 1950s when Indonesia experienced parliamentary democracy for the first time. The dynamics of party politics is still marked by aliran ('streams'), i.e. some of the biggest political parties still have a mass base and are embedded in specific milieus. But politik aliran has lost a lot of its significance and re-emerged in quite a different form after 1998. Moreover, parties soon turned out to be characterised by all kinds of deficiencies. Most of them are ridden with internal conflicts, their financing is often shady, their platforms are vague and party elites tend to monopolise decision-making. Obviously, beyond old loyalties and ideologies, other forces are at work. In recent debates on political parties in Indonesia the salience of aliran is generally acknowledged (King 2003; Baswedan 2004) , although often with certain reservations (Johnson Tan 2004; Sherlock 2004 and . A few authors have focussed on deficiencies such as 'cartelisation' (Slater 2005) and formal institutional flaws (Sherlock 2005) or they have tried to assess the lacking or uneven institutionalisation of political parties (Johnson Tan 2006; Tomsa 2006b ). Some Scholars question the validity of the aliran approach from a class perspective (Robison / Hadiz 2004; Hadiz 2004a and , others cite new evidence from regression analysis and raise serious doubts (Mujani / Liddle 2006) . In connection with a range of recent studies on local politics (Hadiz 2004a; Choi 2004; Vel 2005; Mietzner 2007 ) the emergent picture is very complex. A more comprehensive approach to understand party politics in Indonesia today does still not exist.
This article analyses political parties from two different perspectives. It is argued that parties are still socially rooted, therefore a modified aliran approach still has its analytical value. At the same time, one can witness a weakening of aliran (dealiranisasi) and a concomitant 'Philippinisation', which denotes the convergence of some key traits of Philippine and Indonesian parties and party systems. In that way, the peculiar characteristics of party politics and the conflicting forces at play will be systematically pointed out.
Part 2 of this article helps to understand the concept of 'aliran' as interpreted in the 1950s
since the term is now often used confusingly. It lays the base for a comparison of parties in the 1950s with those today, and it depicts in brief political party evolution until the fall of Suharto.
Describing Indonesia's political parties against the backdrop of aliran helps to elucidate the current, contradictory developments that are analysed in part 3 and 4. The whole process is conceptualised as 'Philippinisation', which is indicated by the rise of presidential or presidentialised parties, the increasing intra-party authoritarianism, the prevalence of 'money politics', the lack of meaningful political platforms, weak loyalties to parties, cartels with shifting coalitions and the upsurge of new local elites.
The Heyday of politik aliran in the 1950s and the Erosion under Suharto
When the first political parties were established in Indonesia in the 1920s they were not able to fulfil their usual functions yet. Elections and real parliaments did not exist under colonial rule. As early mass-mobilisers, however, they consolidated social milieus and strengthened what later came to be known as aliran. In the 1950s and 1960s, the deep ideological roots of political parties were conceptualised by Indonesianists with this aliran (literally 'streams') Ufen: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia 7 approach. Clifford Geertz (1960) first outlined this model in his main work 'The Religion of Java'. His famous differentiation between abangan (syncretists stressing animistic beliefs), santri (followers of a purer Islam) and priyayi (those mostly influenced by a Hinduist aristocratic culture) had a lasting impact on further studies on Java. 1 For the purpose of analyzing political parties in the 1950s, it is, however, much more practical to refer to a slightly different interpretation made by Geertz himself in 'Peddlers and Princes', where he conceptualised PNI 2 , Masyumi, NU and PKI as the organisational foci of aliran:
'As well as its political organization proper, each party has connected with it, formally or informally, women's clubs, youth and students groups, labour unions, peasant organizations, charitable associations, private schools, religious or philosophical societies, veterans' associations, savings clubs, and so forth, which serve to bind it to the local social system. For that reason, each party with its aggregation of specialized associations provides a general framework within which a wide range of social activities can be organized, as well as an over-all ideological rationale to give those activities point and direction' (Geertz 1963: 14) .
According to Geertz, this aliran complex is as much a social movement as a political party.
Aliran were based on old forms of social integration with their concomitant world views, but political parties and associated organisations would not form a relatively stable pattern of inter-aliran relations until the 1950s. The four most important parties, which obtained fourfifths of the votes altogether in 1955 (see table 1), grew out of and at the same time reshaped and politicised these streams (Feith 1957: 31ff; Feith 1962: 125ff) . The nationalist PNI represented those who were still set apart by an aristocratic Javanese culture and earned their living mainly as state employees and civil servants or were clients of them. 3 The PKI was probably the best-organised party with loyal followers among abangan workers in urban and rural areas. 4 The orthodox santri comprised modernists and traditionalists. The latter under 1 The abangan cultural variant (Geertz 1960: 6) , typical of 'the more traditionalized peasants and their proletarianized comrades in the town' (Geertz 1960: 11) , consisted of specific ritual feasts, spirit beliefs, sorcery, magic, etc. and stressed the animistic elements of the 'over-all Javanese syncretism'. The santri sub-tradition was characterised by the belief in a more orthodox Islam and was to be found mainly among traders and some sections of the peasantry. The priyayi variant referred mostly to the Hinduist aspects and had a deep impact on the bureaucratic culture of Java.
2
The party names are explained below in tables 1, 2 and 3. Abangan and priyayi orientations soon aligned 'into a unit as opposed to the santri' (Geertz 1965: 128) . Geertz (1965: 129ff) has differentiated five predominant cleavages ('distinctions'): firstly, between a Javanist (priyayi-abangan) and an Islamic 'religio-ideological class'; secondly, between insaf (politically responsive) and masa bodoa (politically unresponsive); thirdly, between 'elite ' and 'mass'; fourthly, between 'urban' and 'rural'; and fifthly, between 'modern' and 'traditional'. 4 The PKI comprised to a large extent not secularised, ideologically well-educated cadres. It had to adjust its revolutionary rhetoric to the religious worldviews of most of their abangan followers from Javanese villages and to construct patron-client relations. In 1964, the PKI had -according to The parties did not have any strong criteria for membership and were not able to build on a steady flow of revenues (Feith 1962: 122ff) . Their leadership mostly comprised politicians with sceptical views on modern liberal democracy at least. Parties in the 1950s were deeply rooted, but elitist. They offered principal channels of access to the bureaucracy. Their power was, thus, based upon the control of segments of the bureaucracy, the military and state companies, as well as their connections to private entrepreneurs. 6 its own figures -around 2.5 million party members (1954: 165.000) and 16 million members in associated mass organisations (Mortimer 1969) .
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Usually, NU and PNI or Masyumi and PSI worked together in these coalitions, which always excluded the PKI. 2 ). Golkar 8 , the regime vehicle, was always able to maintain a two-thirds majority in the national parliament, while the PPP and the PDI fulfilled the function of restricted opposition parties. At the height of the Asian financial crisis, the New Order crumbled not because of political party opposition but in the wake of student demonstrations and as a result of intra-elite conflict and bargaining.
Parties and Elections since 1998: The Reconfiguration after Suharto
The pressure to reform the polity was enormous immediately after the power transfer from at least to a certain extent) (Suryakusuma 1999; Kompas 2004a and . All these groupings failed. To be successful, parties needed the infrastructure and connections built up during the New Order period (Golkar, PPP and, to a certain degree, PDI-P), the indirect backing of religious organisations (PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, etc.) and grass-roots networks created long before (PK).
In the run-up to the polls there was a lot of speculation whether the aliran patterns of the 1950s would re-emerge. In the end, it turned out that politik aliran still plays a role, but in a different form than in the 1950s, and that some other mechanisms did shape the behaviour of parties and voters, too. Golkar won 21.6% (1999: 22.5%) and is now the strongest party in the parliament. The PDI-P suffered a shocking defeat and lost more than 15 percentage points due to disappointment with the Megawati presidency and the performance of PDI-P politicians in general. The other huge surprise besides the devastating loss of the PDI-P and the sudden rise of Partai
Demokrat was the triumph of the Islamist PKS (formerly PK), which won 7.3% of the votes.
The party was even able to come first in Jakarta, ahead of the PD. These results revealed widespread dissatisfaction with established parties, particularly in the capital. PKB, PPP and PAN each lost slightly. Their dismal performance was only overshadowed by the trouncing of the PDI-P.
Six of the ten largest parties in the current national parliament are Islamic and four are secular (see table 3 ). The most important cleavage structuring the party system as a whole is the one dividing the secular and the Islamic parties. The latter are divided into moderate Islamic and Islamist parties. 10 The polarisation between status quo-and pro-democracy parties immediately after the fall of Suharto soon died down. Today, this cleavage 11 is hardly reflected 9
Only parties with at least ten MPs in the DPR or with more than three per cent of the votes in more than half of the province and district parliaments were allowed to participate in the 2004 elections. Moreover, they had to have branches in at least two thirds of the provinces and in at least two thirds of the districts in these provinces. 10 Islamist parties are defined here as those supporting the introduction of sharia law and aiming at instituting an Islamic state. Although the PKS does not officially embrace this agenda, they are classified as Islamist because of their ideological and organisational background. 11 The aliran and the cleavage approach are closely related. Cleavages are the result of fundamental societal conflicts. They structure the discourse on main issues and are institutionalised by political actors, especially parties (see Lipset / Rokkan 1967 as the locus classicus on cleavages). The terms abangan and santri do not simply denote groupings with different levels of commitment to their religion; at the same time they imply a socio-economic dimension because typically abangan prac- tices, for example, were tightly bound to specific milieus with their respective social bases. In terms of cleavages, the Geertzian framework encompasses a religious and a socio-economic divide at the same time. This highly complex model still tends to confuse actual debates on party politics in Indonesia.
Ufen: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia 13 in the parliament at all. Golkar and PDI-P, for instance, are barely different when it comes to their stance on policy issues, their involvement in corruption scandals and the way the party apparatus is managed.
The secular parties are Golkar, PDI-P, PDS (essentially Christian) and PD. 12 The PDI-P, which has a large following among Christians and secularists, is still identified with Sukarno, the immensely popular and charismatic first president of Indonesia. Megawati, his daughter and the party chairwoman, still embodies this Sukarnoist tradition.
The six Whereas in the 1950s ethnic or religious affiliation largely determined partisan loyalties and voting behaviour, the relationship nowadays is much more complex. In this context, Liddle and Mujani (2006) have demonstrated that prognosticating an individual's partisan choice in relation to his piousness (as defined by engaging in specific religious practices) is difficult today. Nevertheless, using bivariate and multiple regression techniques, King (2003) showed that there was a broad continuity in the election results (1955 and 1999) at the district level.
He correlated support for major parties and found striking similarities that suggest that fundamental loyalties to parties, essentially defined in terms of religion, have survived in spite of socio-economic shifts.
Nevertheless, the usage of the terms abangan and santri today is questionable. It makes more sense to differentiate between 'followers of political Islam' (all of whom are orthodox Muslims) and 'secularists' (Christians, syncretists, and orthodox Muslims not interested in politicising their religion). Regression analysis may then lead to stronger correlations than Liddle and Mujani's (2006) . 13 This modified politik aliran model is different from the two versions presented by Geertz (1960 and 1963) their own militias, and elites distance themselves more often from party politics, inter alia because of the programmatical shallowness. 16 During the elections of 1955, the impact of money politics was much less striking than nowadays. Candidates for party posts and for the legislature probably did not have to pay for being nominated. Though party financing in the 1950s was in many cases tainted by corruption or questionable influences, 17 politics was not as closely interconnected with business as it is today. Moreover, parties in the 1950s relied on extensive networks at the village level and sought active support by village elites. 18 Today, these networks in different forms still exist, but the direct identification with party leaders via the mass media has increased considerably. 16 'Almost all civil servants, including the top heads and including judges and public prosecutors, were party members. Only army and police members were forbidden membership in parties. When a prominent person was not formally a member of a party, it was common for him to be labeled on the basis of his personal association and general outlook' (Feith 1962: 124) 17 The financing of the PNI with its contacts to the state bureaucracy was especially questionable (Feith 1957: 26-27; Rocamora 1975: 112ff) . Feith assumes that the PKI got foreign donations, whereas Muslim parties used their links to landowners, rubber growers, batik manufacturers, etc. NU was said to be poor. For its leaders, 'social resources', i.e. social and political relations in and around the villages, were more important than financial resources (Feith 1957: 28) . 18 'The parties which were unable to establish an extensive network of village-level organization, and hoped instead to contact the villager through mass media, were quite unsuccessful -even where they had considerable financial resources and the advantages of occupancy of government power' (Feith 1957, 26 In Indonesia, there is a trend of convergence with these Philippine traits of party politics.
The most obvious ones, described in detail below, are the following: the rise of presidential parties, the authoritarian traits of parties which tend to be factionalised, the predominance of purely materialistic objectives ('money politics'), the lack of detailed programmes, weak allegiances towards parties, the construction of cartels with fluid coalitions, and the rise of local elites.
The Rise of Presidential Parties and the Presidentialisation of Parties
Since the constitutional amendments, the introduction of direct presidential elections and the strengthening of the presidency by raising levels for impeachment, the executive has grown stronger in relation to the parliament. Political parties have lost the ability to elect the president in the People's Congress (MPR) as they did in 1999. 
Internal Processes: Authoritarian Personalism and Factionalism
Authoritarian personalism is to some extent a heritage of the political culture of the New Order. 25 Party organisation was as centralised as the whole polity and intra-party decisionmaking as opaque and undemocratic as the authoritarian system in general. The oppression in the 1990s gave rise to charismatic, supposedly pro-democratic political leaders such as reinforced by the mass media, the presidential system and party laws benefiting central executives in Jakarta.
In most parties today, crucial decisions such as the nomination of candidates (Haris 2005: 9ff) are made by some core executive members who are usually loyal to one charismatic leader. The decision-making process is almost fully orientated from the top down to the branches. 26 Furthermore, the statutes of most parties do not clearly regulate how party congresses and elections have to be organised (Notosusanto 2005) . Sometimes these regulations are altered even at the beginning of conventions, with notorious examples being the recent congresses of Golkar and the PDI-P. 27 The big political parties have designed the election and party laws to their advantage. They wati's leadership. One means of penalisation is to recall 28 parliamentarians, i.e. to terminate their mandate and replace them. 29 The right to do so, a typical New Order brainchild, was 26 In August 2005, the notorious businessman Fuad Bawazier quit PAN because it 'had violated its own democratic principles' after its central board issued a decree on 22 July, which bans provincial chapter members from electing regional executives who go against Jakarta's policy (PAN split wider as co-founder tenders his resignation, Jakarta Post, 15.8.2005 ). 27 End of family feud caps rift-ridden PDI-P congress, Jakarta Post, 2.4.2005. 28 Article 12 of Law No. 31 / 2002 on political parties states that party members who are elected legislative members can be dismissed from the legislative body if they lose their membership in their respective political parties. 29 Some MPs request to put a district system into practice in order to bolster the position of single parliamentarians and to counterbalance regional and national party leaderships. At the same time, the notorious recalling mechanism would be harder to apply. The Political Economy of Parties: 'Money Politics'
Most political observers are particularly interested in institutions like party or electoral laws and tend to assess the political future of Indonesia rather optimistically, especially when they are funded by foreign organisations that work on improving the quality of democracy in Indonesia. In contrast, those analyzing Indonesian politics from a neo-marxist political economy standpoint take issue with mainstream functionalist approaches:
'(…) most of these parties are not ‹natural› political entities, carrying out ‹aggregating› and ‹articulating› functions, but constitute tactical alliances that variously draw on the same pool of predatory interests. Notwithstanding certain ideological schisms within and between parties, their function has primarily been to act as a vehicle to contest access to the spoils of state power' (Robison / Hadiz 2004: 228) .
To Robison and Hadiz (2004a: 258) , politics in Indonesia nowadays is '(…) driven increasingly by the logic of money politics'. Indeed, parties need financial support from private entrepreneurs. Membership fees are mostly insignificant, as is public funding. Regulations on party financing exist, but violations are hardly ever punished (Hadiwinata 2006: 106) . Entrepreneurs presumably dictate (or 'influence') the stance of parties on specific issues. In recent years, some businessmen have become party heads such as Yusuf Kalla (Golkar) . 35 Penguasa dan Pengusaha Kuasai Golkar (Powerful and businessmen dominate Golkar), Kompas, 22.12.2004 ; PAN Dipimpin Pengusaha (PAN led by businessman), Kompas, 12.4.2005 . 36 Anderson mentions photographs of cabinet ministers before 1949 'in shorts and sandals' and in contrast to the congressional opulence of the Philippines. The revolutionaries '(…) were not at all sharply distinguished from one another in social origins or economic resources (…)' (Anderson 1996: 28) . Part of this ethos of simplicity still imbued politicians in the 1950s.
It is no secret that before the 2005 introduction of direct elections at the provincial, district and municipal levels, when the respective parliaments had the sole power to determine who became governor, bupati or mayor respectively, most of these competitions were decided by the disbursement of huge amounts of money to the councillors (Rifai 2003) . The institution of direct elections at these levels did not erase 'money politics' but transferred it. In the pilkada the pairs had to pay their respective parties for the candidacy and they had to shoulder the campaign costs. They spent an average of US$10 million at the provincial level and US$1.6 million at the municipality / regency level (Rinakit 2005) . The latest example is the race for governorship in Jakarta. 37 To get the nomination as official candidate, one has to spend around US$20 million, plus the campaign costs. This huge amount of money is the minimum a governor will have to earn once in office just to compensate his initial investment. 38 That investments necessitate rent-seeking activities is a widespread phenomenon in parliaments, too. In the DPR the situation is as gloomy as at lower levels. In its corruption barome- even an Islamist party like PKS is not willing to play the Islamic card during elections, but rather focuses on issues such as the fight against corruption.
The fact that platforms are shallow is not surprising in the face of global developments. After the collapse of communism, during a profound crisis of social democracy and decreasing political polarisation in many Western countries, party programmes have been losing their clear contours. In Europe, the typical characteristics of catch-all parties are still salient: a drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage, the further strengthening of top leadership groups, a downgrading of the role of the individual party member, the de-emphasis of the specific social-class or denominational clientele, and the objective to securing access to a 24 Ufen: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia variety of interest groups (Kirchheimer 1966) . In Indonesia, Golkar and PDI-P are the most obvious versions of catch-all parties.
Weak platforms indicate that the link between parties and voters is loosening and that the rootedness in milieus is decreasing. In a national survey, the Asia Foundation found out that linkages between voters and parties are mostly 'emotional' and not based on meaningful knowledge of the specific platforms of parties:
'The widespread lack of party preferences, other than those based on emotional identification, can largely be explained by the fact that most Indonesians are unaware of differences among the political parties. Two-thirds of the voters (66%) say they do not know what differences exist among the parties or that there are none' (Asia Foundation 2003: 100).
After elections, voters in Indonesia are hardly interested in everyday party work and are generally ill-informed on policy issues. Campaigning lacks content. Voters largely do not elect parties along the lines of their platforms.
The Collusive Relationship between Parties: Cartels and Shifting Coalitions
In a widely quoted article, Katz and Mair (1995) Cartels are in some measure a result of a fragmented party system with unclear majorities. 44 Abdurrahman Wahid was forced to form a grand coalition in October 1999 because his party 43 The latter point is well illustrated by Mietzner (Opportunities, pitfalls of RI's new democracy, Jakarta Post, 16.10.2006) in his analysis of the rising influence of opinion polls in Indonesia on shaping the behaviour of political party elites. 44 Conceivably, the fragmentation of the party system in Indonesia is not the result but the cause of the proportional system. The choice of this system after independence and again in 1998 / 99 was due to the high number of relevant political actors. The introduction of a majority system seems to be more probable if there are just two major players (Nohlen 2004 : 408 and 415ff). Difficulties of interparty coalition-building often arise in presidential systems, especially when combined with multipartism. Executive / legislative deadlock can sometimes be the result (Mainwaring 1993) . In Indonesia, these tendencies brought the parliament to a virtual standstill in 2001 during the prolonged impeachment process against Abdurrahman Wahid, and this happened again in late 2004. But these phases of immobility gave way to new coalitions formed to rescue the underlying logic of cartelisation.
The sudden change of guard at the top of Golkar in late 2004 can be interpreted as a manoeuvre to secure the benefits of governing in Jakarta, i.e. ministerial posts. 47 The move by party delegates to vote for the incumbent vice-president, Yusuf Kalla, and sideline Akbar Tanjung testifies to the strength of directly elected politicians and is reminiscent of the opportunism of MPs in the Philippines, who switch into the camp of the new president immediately after elections. 48 Only now a supposedly strong president with a parliamentary majority has emerged. A stable pattern of 'government' versus 'opposition' has not developed yet, however. In many regional and provincial assemblies, too, opposition to the cartels is organised only by a handful of councillors. 49 45 Coalitions are generally not based on well-defined contracts outlining government objectives and peculiar interests of political parties as members of this coalition. Co-operation among parties is fluid and strongly dependent on the outcome of power struggles in these parties. 46 He therefore tried to co-opt other parties. But ahead of the second round of the presidential elections, Golkar, under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung, decided to side with Megawati, although Yusuf Kalla was Susilo's running mate. After the victory of Susilo and Yusuf Kalla, a marked polarisation occurred between Susilo's 'People's Coalition', which comprised the PD, PAN, PPP, PKS as well as other small parties grouped in the 'Democratic Pioneer Star' (BPD) faction, and the 'Nationhood Coalition', which was made up of the PDI-P, Golkar, PDS and PBR with the support of the PKB. The main issues were the installation of the 11 parliamentarian sub-committee chairmen and the appointment of the chief of the armed forces. Some of the ministers in Susilo's cabinet were not acknowledged by their own parties. In October 2004, the PPP also left the 'Nationhood Coalition', inter alia because two PPP members -Suryadharma Ali and Soegiharto -were accepted as ministers by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 47 On the whole episode, see Tomsa (2006a: 17ff) . 48 But unlike Philippine politicians, MPs in Indonesia hardly ever switch parties, at least at the national level. Suharto as the highest patron has given way to a decentralised neo-patrimonialism with a range of interwoven national and regional patron-client networks.
Local politics, tightly controlled by the military regime under the New Order at least until the early 1990s, is increasingly marked by 'predatory networks' (Robison / Hadiz 2004 ) and may evolve into outright 'bossism' (Sidel 1999) . Although the central leaderships of political parties can dictate most decisions on policy issues and are able to push through their candidates for the national parliament and for their respective central executives, a tug of war between Jakarta and the regions is usual at lower levels (Choi 2004 The pilkada have not only strengthened but also weakened local and regional party leaders in a way, for many of the candidates were chosen from civil servants or businessmen without any strong party links despite the fact that parties had the nomination right. Often, candidates were not party members initially or they belonged to party A but ran for party B. At this level, popular candidates look around for those parties offering them the best opportunities, and party institutionalisation at the local and regional level is much weaker than at the national level in Jakarta. Party offices, for example, are generally inactive in between elections. 53 At the grass-roots level, political parties frequently did not have adequate, i.e. well-to-do, popular candidates. The pilkada, thus, were an arena for well-connected bureaucrats and wealthy businessmen who both profited from candidacies auctioned off by weakened parties (Mietzner 2005 and 2007) . 54 This constellation strengthened tendencies of dealiranisasi and of entrenching newly emerging local oligarchies. (Satgas) of PDI-P, the Kabah Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Kabah, GPK) of PPP, the National Guard (Gerakan Pemuda Kebangkitan Bangsa, Garda Bangsa) of PKB and the PAN Youth Force (Barisan Muda PAN). The Banser (Barisan Ansor Serbaguna) of PKB probably has around 100,000 members. They '(…) have been behind many violent action campaigns, most notably when President Wahid was given a hard time by the media for his adulterous affairs and corruption" (Bertrand 2004: 339) . 53 Personal communication with Michael Buehler, Jakarta, 7.10.2006. 54 According to Rinakit (2005) , 87% of regional elections in 2005 were won by the incumbents, local bureaucrats and military personnel. the DPR. Moreover, its delegates are not allowed to be members of political parties.
Conclusion
The two comparisons with the political party system of Indonesia in the 1950s and with the current one in the Philippines help to elucidate two fundamental types of dynamics shaping the Indonesian party system since 1998: the enduring impact of politik aliran and the eroding effects of 'Philippinisation'.
The first national elections in 1955 resulted in a party system structured by aliran. During the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) some major cleavages were deepened which brought about civil war. Throughout the New Order era (1965 / 66-1998) , opposition was restrained and politik aliran subdued, but the root causes of social conflict were by no means eliminated.
In spite of four decades of authoritarianism, which effectively restricted the organisational freedom of political parties, many of the old parties re-entered the political realm after 1998.
The PKB, for example, whose predecessor was the NU party of the 1950s, is based on a large network of mostly rural, religious boarding schools (pesantren) and their charismatic principals, the kiai, and the PDI-P (1955: PNI) is a secular party thriving on the lasting charisma of former president Sukarno. The modernist Masyumi now has a few successors (PBB, partly PPP, PAN, partly PKS).
Aliran still structure the party system in general. They are different now from those in the 1950s, however. And instead of distinguishing between Geertzian abangan and santri, it is much more useful to differentiate between secularists and followers of political Islam. The most important cleavage structuring the party system as a whole since 1998 is the one dividing secular and Islamic parties. The latter, in turn, are divided into moderate and Islamist parties.
In order to adequately understand Indonesian party politics since 1998, different approaches have to be combined. Central mechanisms are still explainable with reference to notions of 'aliran'. Nevertheless, the political dynamics since Suharto imply a process of dealiranisasi and 'Philippinisation'.
Ufen: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia 29 Philippine parties are characterised by weak platforms, a high frequency of party-switching, short-term coalition-building, factionalism, inactivity of the apparatuses in between elections, low membership figures, the dominance of presidential candidates, and rent-seeking politicians co-operating in cartels. A range of factors indicate a process that brings these two party systems closer to each other: firstly, the rise of presidential or presidentialised parties, a prime example being the Partai Demokrat of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; secondly, the authoritarianism and personalism with powerful 'party advisors' and executives which punish unruly members, marginalise intra-party opposition and further factionalisation; thirdly, the dominance of 'money politics' with bought candidacies, MPs acting as brokers for private companies, businessmen taking over party chairmanships, and billionaire financiers determining policies behind the scenes; fourthly, the erosion of ideologies with poor political platforms and decreasing party loyalties; fifthly, the cartel-like co-operation of parties as indicated by rainbow coalitions, an unorganised opposition, the musyawarah dan mufakat mechanism and the collusion in tolerating corruption; and lastly, the emergence of new, powerful local elites. Some of these characteristics are more salient below the national level.
To be sure, 'Philippinisation' does not denote the full convergence of party politics in the two Southeast Asian countries. Local elites are more fractured in Indonesia and do not control parties in Jakarta. Party-switching is -at least at the national level -uncommon. Parties are far less presidentialised and political Islam still has a strong impact on parties' behaviour, whereas politicised religion in the Philippines does not structure the party system. The resilience of politik aliran hampers a full 'Philippinisation'.
But what accounts for the increasing similarity? In addition to national reconfigurations and legacies (the destruction of the radical political left, the vestiges of authoritarianism, etc.), global developments explain some of the trends in Indonesia. Because of the internationalisation and presidentialisation of politics, executives gain in importance. Moreover, the stability of traditional political loyalties is declining in general, and political leaders can appeal directly to voters via the mass media.
Another decisive factor is the specific economic transformation of Indonesia. Whereas in the 1950s political rent-seeking seems to have been contained to a certain degree by political competitors and active party supporters, by strong ideological commitments on the part of political leaders and in many cases by the sheer lack of opportunities, nowadays a cartelised elite sees politics to a great extent as business. The new symbiosis of entrepreneurs, politicians and state officials seems to be a direct result of the New Order and its coalition of rentseeking military, administrative and political elites. The development of the party system as described above is cause for concern. Indonesian parties may evolve further into Philippine-like political machines. It is also possible, though, that new ideologies will appear, either taking the form of a leftist neo-populism as in Latin America or -which is more likely -as Islamisation. Because of the decline of abangan orientations and the impact of Western secular ideas, new religious divides are being constructed.
Religion is repeatedly politicised for this reason. In parliament, religious issues set heated discussions in motion, the latest examples being the debates on the anti-pornography bill and on the introduction of sharia laws at the regional level. To be sure, this does not outweigh the illustrated erosion of traditional loyalties and party structures.
